tl;dr: Pedersen commitments1 are one of the most important cryptographic primitives for a beginner to understand, in my opinion.
Algorithms
$\mathsf{CM.Gen}(\mathbb{G}) \rightarrow \mathsf{ck}$
Pick two random group elements in $\Gr$ as the commitment key:
\begin{align}
G \randget\Gr\\
H \randget\Gr\\
\end{align}
It is crucial that this is done correctly such that nobody knows $\tau$ such that $H = \tau G$.
Return: \begin{align} \ck \gets (G, H) \end{align}
$\mathsf{CM.Commit}(\ck, m; r) \rightarrow C$
Parse the commitment key: \begin{align} (G, H)\parse \ck \end{align}
Commit: \begin{align} C \gets m G + rH \end{align}
The randomness $r$ must be picked freshly for every $m$! Committing to different messages $m_1$ and $m_2$ using the same randomness $r$ would leak! i.e., Given a commitment $m_1 G + rH$ and another commitment $m_2 G + rH$ with the same randomness, one can subtract and obtain $(m_1 - m_2)G$ which leaks the difference!
Security
Binding
We are going to loosely define binding as the property that guarantees no adversary that is given a correctly set up $\ck$ and a commitment $C$ can find two different openings $(m_1, r_1)$ and $(m_2, r_2)$ such that they both commit as $C$.
It is easy to show by contradiction that such an adversary $\Adv$ would yield another adversary $\Badv$ that can solve discrete logorithms on random $(G, H)$ instances.
Proof:
Suppose that
\begin{align}
\exists m_1 \ne m_2, \exists r_1 \ne r_2\ \text{s.t.}\ m_1 G + r_1 H &= m_2 G + r_2 H\Rightarrow\\
(m_1 - m_2) G + (r_1 - r_2) H &= 0\Rightarrow\\
(r_1 - r_2) H &= (m_2 - m_1) G\Rightarrow\\
H &= \frac{m_2 - m_1}{r_1 - r_2}G\Rightarrow\\
\orange{\tau} &= \frac{m_2 - m_1}{r_1 - r_2}
\end{align}
Conclusion
This post has an associated tweet:
I think Pedersen commitments are a gentle starting point for teaching cryptography to anyone!
— alin.apt (@alinush) November 3, 2025
A **commitment** is a sealed envelope with a message m in it such that:
1. no one can tell what m is in it (hiding)
2. no one can open it to a different m (binding)
Pedersen below 👇 pic.twitter.com/OVQ76kXAFF
References
For cited works, see below 👇👇
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Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing, by Pedersen, Torben Pryds, in Proceedings on Advances in Cryptology, 1992Â ↩